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Fuchs et al. [Phys. Rev. A, 1997] suggested an optimal attack on the BB84 protocol, where the
necessary and sufficient condition for optimality involves the joint Hilbert space of the sender and
the attacker. In this work, we propose a refined optimality criteria involving the Hilbert space of the
attacker only. It reveals that the optimal (non-zero) overlaps between the attackers post-interactions
states must be equal and numerically same as the difference between the fidelity and the disturbance
at the receiving end. That amount turns out to be same as the reduction (factor) in Bell violation
when estimated for the equivalent entanglement-based protocol. Further, a series of necessary and
sufficient conditions unveil the structure of the optimal states which therefore are the only and all
possible optimal interactions. We show that these optimal states are same as the outputs of an
optimal phase-covariant cloner. We also demonstrate various methods to derive optimal unitary
evolutions that an eavesdropper is interested to know in order to mount an optimal attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The BB84 protocol [1] can establish an information-
theoretically secure secret key between two distant par-
ties. Alice encodes a stream of classical bits (cbits) into
an ensemble of quantum bits (qubits) using two mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs). She then transmits the qubits
one-by-one over a quantum channel. Bob, at the receiv-
ing end, measures individually in one of the encoding
bases, chosen randomly. Later they reconcile bases pub-
licly over an authenticated classical channel to filtrate a
sifted key.
A third party (Eve) is allowed to tamper the quantum
channel. However, any approach to learn the state of
the qubit introduces an error which is further detectable
by the recipient. The legitimate parties can estimate
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) by discussing over
the public channel on a part of the sifted key. Within
a threshold value QBER?, a classical post-processing
(CPP) is faithful to filter a shared secret on which Eve
has virtually no information.
An advanced eavesdropping model [2] is to extract the
information of a transmitted qubit via an ancilla qubit by
interacting unitarily. Given that the attacker is allowed
to defer her measurement until after basis reconciliation,
an one-way (OW) CPP is faithful if the estimated QBER
remains below the critical value 0.1464 where the secret
key-rate becomes zero. The authors could estimate the
maximum knowledge gain (KG) by an attacker that even-
tually appeared a tight bound due to an witness inter-
action. Nonetheless, there could be infinitely many such
saturating candidates (interactions) which are unitarily
equivalent [6]. In that attack model, a candidate inter-
action must pass a formal verification of optimality, viz.,
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a necessary and sufficient condition(NSC) [2] involving
the joint Hilbert space of the sender and the attacker.
We suggest here a necessary and sufficient condition
for optimality that involves the Hilbert space of the at-
tacker only. The verification is easier to perform than
that in [2]. This new criteria explicitly depicts the geom-
etry of the optimal states. We find its direct connection
with the equivalent entanglement-based protocol and with
optimal phase-covariant (pc) cloner [11].
To be precise, an optimal attack is characterized by the
non-zero overlaps between various post-interaction states
of Eve’s ancilla. The optimal overlap must equate the
fidelity less the disturbance incurred at Bob’s end. We
show that the amount is same as the reduction (factor)
in the CHSH sum [4, 5] for an equivalent entanglement-
based scheme. Geometrically speaking, it amounts to the
contraction in the Bloch vectors associated with Bob’s
states.
We carry on through a chain of NSCs to derive in-
finitely many optimal interactions, and therefore without
ambiguity, these are the only and all possible optimal in-
teractions. They are unitarily the same as the optimal
states derived earlier by Acharyya et al. in [6]. An op-
timal post-interaction joint state (PIJS) clearly exhibits
an one-to-one correspondence with the optimal measure-
ment of Eve. Thus, Eves measurement setup determines
her interaction and vice versa. Relation between Eve’s
optimal measurements for two MUBs are established.
The optimal PIJSs are in sync with the outputs obtained
by an optimal pc-cloner [11].
We then consider the task of characterizing the opti-
mal unitary attacks, i.e., to derive the optimal unitary
operators. First, we describe the basic approach to find
an optimal unitary for a given optimal PIJSs. We discuss
the limitations of that method when it comes to work for
the optimal PIJSs described in an arbitrary measurement
basis for Eve. To bypass this hurdle, we start with the
PIJSs by fixing Eve’s measurement basis as the compu-
tational basis, and develop a quick hack to get the sim-
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2plest form of an optimal unitary that must accompany a
specific initial state (IS) of the ancilla. However, given
a PIJS, there could be infinitely many optimal unitary
interactions: we discuss methods to find any and all of
them from the prior knowledge of an already derived op-
timal unitary. Once an optimal unitary is found for an
IS, one can leverage this knowledge to find an optimal
unitary for any other IS just by finding a transformation
rule between the initial states. Finally, we figure out the
transformation rule to get an optimal unitary in one mea-
surement basis from an already derived optimal unitary
in some other measurement basis. We demonstrate these
methods in place for a few chosen states to understand
the other intricacies. Essentially we have characterized
the whole space of optimal unitary attacks.
First, we discuss in Sec. II the framework of optimal
eavesdropping [2], the generic optimal interactions [6],
and the interrelation between Eves optimal measure-
ments across the two MUBs 1. Then we discuss briefly
the results in Sec. III-IV and defer their derivations and
illustrations until in Sec. V. We conclude by summariz-
ing the new findings and also discuss further scopes to
explore.
II. ELEMENTS OF OPTIMAL EAVESDROPPING
Here we brief the attack model, the objective functions
to be optimized and their bounds, and the optimal states
after an interaction. We exhibit some direct connections
that a practical attack has with Bell violation and with
an optimal pc-cloner.
A. Alice’s encoding
For encoding, Alice uses two orthonormal bases con-
jugate to each other: the computational basis, and the
Hadamard basis. The basis states correspond to the
eigenstates of the phase-flip operator σz and bit-flip op-
erator σx, respectively. The following notations for the
bases and their states are used interchangeably through-
out the paper.
Computational basis Hadamard basis
Basis States Basis States
+ {|0〉, |1〉} × { |0〉+|1〉√
2
, |0〉−|1〉√
2
}
Various labellings used
xy {|x〉, |y〉} uv {|u〉, |v〉}
0 {|0〉0, |1〉0} 1 {|0〉1, |1〉1}
Z {|+ z〉, | − z〉} X {|+ x〉, | − x〉}
1 Although a new addition, these interrelations are better fitted in
this recapitulation section only.
β¯ denotes the conjugate of a basis β. The Hadamard
transform H := 1√
2
(σz + σx) flips the bases (H : β 7→ β¯)
while the basis states can be written with respect to the
computational basis elements as |a〉β = Hβ |a〉 for a =
0, 1. The orthogonal counterpart of a state |a〉 is denoted
by |a⊕ 1〉 or |a¯〉. Alice encodes the cbit 0 into a qubit in
state |x〉 or |u〉, and encodes 1 into |y〉 or |v〉.
B. The attack model
Eve attacks the quantum channel with an intention to
indirectly learn the transmitted qubits one-by-one. She
attaches a probe in state |e〉 ∈ HE to Alice’s qubit that
was transmitted in state |aβ〉 ∈ HA. She evolves the joint
system unitarily (U) from the pre-interaction joint state
|aβ〉|e〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE to the post-interaction joint state
|Sβa 〉 = U |aβ〉|e〉. (1)
The interaction entangles Eve’s probe with Alice’s qubit,
and the joint state possess the following Schmidt decom-
position:
|Sa〉β =
√
Fβ |a〉β |ξa〉β +
√
Dβ |a¯〉β |ζa〉β . (2)
Bob receives the qubit intact or flipped, with frequency
Fβ or Dβ , respectively
2. Consequently, he finds the chan-
nel producing a QBER Dβ for an encoding basis β.
The corresponding states of Eve’s ancilla: the fidelity
state |ξa〉β and the disturbed state |ζa〉β are mutually or-
thogonal. In a fixed basis, when these four interaction
vectors (IVs) share real-valued inner products, they can
be grouped into two mutually orthogonal sets: the fi-
delity set {|ξa〉, |ξa¯〉}, and the disturbed set {|ζa〉, |ζa¯〉}.
Clearly, a two-qubit probe suffices to describe Eve’s four-
dimensional Hilbert space HE = H⊗22 .
To distinguish these four states, she needs to incor-
porate a generalized measurement with four outcomes.
Thus, her measurement is considered to be a positive
operator-valued measure (POVM): a resolution of unity
into non-negative Hermitian operators [3, 10]. Denote
her POVMs {Eλ} or {Fλ} depending on whether Alice
encodes in xy or uv basis. Denote them commonly as
{Mλ}β , where an outcome is labeled by λ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
She then interprets the outcome following a strategy
which is a rule for Eve to assign a guess for the state
of the signal sent by Alice.
C. Functions to be optimized
After the measurement by Eve and Bob, each of the
three parties is left with a classical random variable (r.v.),
denoted here as A,B, and E, for Alice, Bob, and Eve,
2 We use Fβ and 1−Dβ interchangeably.
3FIG. 1: A circuit diagram for an optimal eavesdropping on BB84 protocol.
Alice uses one of the two MUBs, β, to encode a cbit ‘a’ into a qubit |a〉β . Eve attaches an ancilla |e〉 and evolves the
joint system unitarily (Ue) that creates an entangled state |Sa〉β . Bob measures the received qubit in basis β′ to get
the cbit b, and keeps it if the bases are matched. After basis reconciliation, Eve measures her ancilla in the POVM
basis {|Mλ〉β}. She interprets her outcome λ by a strategy and bet for aλ to guess Alice’s cbit. When Eves choices
for the unitary and the measurement are optimal, she guesses the key best while not forcing to abort the protocol.
cbit
a ∈ {0, 1}
basis
β ∈ {0, 1}
Alice encodes
|a〉βAlice sends
|e〉Eves ancilla
Ue
|Sa〉β
β′ ∈ {0, 1}
b sifted key
Basis reconciliation
{|Mλ〉}β
λ
Strategy
aλ =
{
0, if λ = 0, 2
1, if λ = 1, 3
respectively. For a permissible QBER, all the legitimate
parties are concerned about, is the secret key-rate (SKR)
which is the ratio of the length of the final secret key
and the sifted key. No analytic expression is known for
the SKR, except a lower bound [7] which depends on the
bipartite mutual informations (MI): MIAE and MIEB .
Minimizing SKR amounts to maximizing MIAE which
in turn is an appropriate candidate to estimate Eve’s
knowledge gain from measurement outcomes as it cap-
tures the reduction of entropy in Alice’s random variable
due to Eve’s knowledge from outcomes. A closely re-
lated, but easier to estimate quantifier is her information
gain (IG) [2]. The optimal MI is found to be a concave
function of the optimal IG.
An optimal interaction is the one that can maximize
KG in both the bases. However, acquiring the maximum
knowledge depends on the right choice of the measure-
ment, called optimal measurement.
For BB84 protocol, for equal prior, both IG and MI
is a function of three parameters: two density operators
ρβa , ρ
β
a¯ and the POVM {Mλ}β . For a fixed QBER Dβ in
each bases, a global maxima exists for each of the func-
tions IG and MI in each of the bases and is attainable [2].
IG?β = 2
√
Dβ¯
(
1−Dβ¯
)
, MI?β =
1
2 φ
(
IG?β
)
,
for the concave function
φ(z) := (1 + z) ln (1 + z) + (1− z) ln (1− z) .
The upper bounds for both IG and MI is attainable in
each of the bases for independently chosen error rates
Dxy and Duv.
Finding an optimal POVM for such IVs correspond to
a rather easier optimization problem: maximize IG over
all POVMs [3]. An upper bound exists and is achievable
in each of the encoding bases. In xy basis, the maximum
IG is attained by the orthonormal eigenprojectors {Eλ :=
|Eλ〉〈Eλ|} of the Hermitian ρx−ρy. For equal prior (and
not necessarily for unequal prior), the same measurement
optimizes both IG and MI for an optimal interaction.
D. The optimal states after an interaction
An optimal interaction induces a restriction on the IVs.
Optimal IVs must satisfy some necessary and sufficient
conditions [2]. Deriving optimal IVs from these condi-
tions remained a harder task [done in Sec. III]. Never-
theless, a judicious bet on a specific choice of IVs passed
the verification [2].
Although, there could be various other choices [6], in-
finitely many for each of the encoding bases, they are
unitarily equivalent. In xy basis, the optimal IVs of Eve
can be expressed in her orthonormal measurement basis
{|Eλ〉} as follows:
|ξ?x〉=D+uv|E0〉+D−uv|E1〉, |ξ?y〉=D−uv|E0〉+D+uv|E1〉,
|ζ?x〉=D+uv|E2〉+D−uv|E3〉, |ζ?y 〉=D−uv|E2〉+D+uv|E3〉.
(3)
Note that, an optimal IV is a superposition of two mea-
surement directions having amplitudes D+uv and D
−
uv de-
fined as
D±β :=
√
1−Dβ ±
√
Dβ√
2
. (4)
Similarly, the general expression representing the op-
timal IVs in uv basis are as follows:
|ξ?u〉=D+xy|F0〉+D−xy|F1〉, |ξ?v〉=D−xy|F0〉+D+xy|F1〉,
|ζ?u〉=D+xy|F2〉+D−xy|F3〉, |ζ?v 〉=D−xy|F2〉+D+xy|F3〉.
(5)
4Any specification of the orthonormal basis {|Eλ〉} (or
{|Fλ〉}) provides a specific instance of optimal IVs in
computational basis, e.g., the optimal IVs due to Fuchs et
al. [2]. Due to varied choices of the eigenbasis, there are
infinitely many setups of the optimal IVs when expressed
in computational basis. A one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the optimal IVs in each basis can be established
(Sec. V) since the optimal measurement directions {|Eλ〉}
in xy basis are interrelated to the optimal measurement
directions {|Fλ〉} in uv basis as follows:
2|F0〉 = |E0〉+ |E1〉+ |E2〉+ |E3〉,
2|F1〉 = |E0〉+ |E1〉 − |E2〉 − |E3〉,
2|F2〉 = |E0〉 − |E1〉 − |E2〉+ |E3〉,
2|F3〉 = |E0〉 − |E1〉+ |E2〉 − |E3〉. (6)
For instance, the measurement basis {|Eλ〉} =
{|00〉, |11〉, |10〉, |01〉} fixes the measurement basis
{|Fλ〉} = {|0¯0¯〉, |1¯1¯〉, |1¯0¯〉, |0¯1¯〉} for Eve. These were the
optimal measurement bases for an optimal Eve described
by Fuchs et al. [2]. Note that the ordering of the basis
elements is retained in that case.
Optimal strategy: Strategy of Eve can now be
determined as follows. As Alice declares her basis
to be β ∈ {0, 1}, Eve measures her ancilla in basis
{|Mλ〉β}λ∈{0,1,2,3} and interprets her measurement out-
come in terms of a guess on Alice’s bit. For +ve outcome,
which occurs for λ = 0, 2, she bets on 0, whereas, for −ve
outcome, which occurs for λ = 1, 3, she bets on 1.
To mount an optimal attack, Eve performs a suit-
able interaction (the allowed unitaries can be found in
Sec. IV), measures accordingly after basis reconciliation,
and finally guesses the signal applying her strategy. Fig. 1
provides a schematic view of the attack model.
E. Practical eavesdropping: the secure zone.
Connecting Bell violation and cloning.
A practical eavesdropping should ideally leave the error
rate symmetric across the two basses, i.e., Dxy = Duv =
D. Otherwise, the legitimate parties can detect the dif-
ference during the error-estimation phase, and thereby
detect the presence of a malevolent party. For a QBER
= D, the maximum amount of the IG in both the bases
reaches 2
√
D(1−D), and is achievable [2].
Due to symmetric eavesdropping, the quantum chan-
nel between Alice-Bob and that between Alice-Eve can
be interpreted as a binary symmetric channel with data-
flipping rate D and DE =
1
2 −
√
D(1−D), respectively.
Thus, at error-rate D, the respective bipartite mutual
informations become
MIAB = 1−H(D) = 1
2
φ (1− 2D) ,
MIAE = 1−H(DE) = 1
2
φ
(
2
√
D(1−D)
)
,
when expressed in bits per sifted-photon (bpsp).
FIG. 2: Key-rate for one-way classical post-processing.
Plotted: optimal Information Gain, bipartite Mutual
Informations, and the secret key-rate. The graph of
MIAE reveals the information-disturbance trade-off.
For QBER D? = 0.1464, MIAB and MIAE coincides,
and the key-rate drops to zero. Below this error rate, an
OW-CPP is faithful.
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The secret key-rate K is bounded below by the dif-
ference MIAB −MIAE . For a QBER D, it amounts to
KD = H(DE) − H(D) bpsp. It decreases with growing
QBER, and vanishes when the two MIs coincide which
happens at the threshold [Fig. 2]
D? =
1
2
(
1− 1√
2
)
≈ 0.1464. (7)
Beyond this tolerable rate, an OW-CPP may not guar-
antee to filtrate a secure key. Within the secure zone
D ∈ [0, D?), key-filtration is guaranteed because Bob
possess more information on Alice’s bit than Eve does.
Following the optimal strategy, Eve can glean (1 −
H(DE)) bits per sifted-photon of the transmission with
fidelity 1 −DE in lieu of introducing an error-rate D at
Bob’s end. The distinguishing advantage for an optimal
attack is
√
D(1−D).
An optimal attack on the prepare-and-measure (p&m)
scheme that we considered here has some interesting con-
nections with the optimal attack on its entanglement-
based (eb) counterpart as well with optimal cloning
mechanisms.
In the eb protocol, the legitimate parties observe a
Bell violation so far the estimated QBER remains in the
secure zone of the p&m scheme. An optimal attack with
QBER D reduces the CHSH correlation co-efficient to
ηD2
√
2 for ηD := 1− 2D. An optimal attack also leaves
Bob with the Bloch vectors contracted by a factor of ηD.
An optimal attack on the p&m scheme can also be
achieved via an optimal phase-covariant cloner [11]. The
cloner is asymmetric since it creates two clones of the
5senders state: a degraded copy for her own with fi-
delity ( 12 +
√
D(1−D)), and a superior copy for Bob
with fidelity 1 − D. At the threshold QBER, both
the fidelity for Bob and Eve reaches the maximum of
1 − D? = 12
(
1 + 1√
2
)
i.e., 85.36%, both in cloning
and in p&m scheme. Moreover, the optimal PIJSs
agrees with the outputs of an optimal pc-cloner. To
be specific, for Eve’s measurement basis (Fuchs basis)
{|E0〉, |E1〉, |E2〉, |E3〉} = {|00〉, |11〉, |01〉, |10〉}, the opti-
mal PIJSs are same as those in [11, Eq. (36)].
III. A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITION FOR OPTIMALITY AND
DERIVING OPTIMAL INTERACTION
VECTORS
Optimality of an interaction require a certificate, e.g.,
a necessary and sufficient condition [2]. The verification
involves the PIJSs in the joint Hilbert space. Here we
suggest a refined NSC involving the states of Eve only
that makes the verification easier. The journey also leads
to derive the optimal IVs which are unitarily equivalent
to those derived in [6].
A. A Necessary and sufficient condition
due to Fuchs et al. [2]
Consider the optimality of the post-interaction
states (2). For Alices symbol aβ ∈ {x, y, u, v}, denote the
PIJS symbol Sβa as X,Y, U, V , respectively. The NSC [2,
Eqs. (38,39)] for optimality in xy basis involves the fol-
lowing four states defined over the joint Hilbert space of
Bob and Eve.
|Wλa〉 := Ba ⊗
√
Eλ |W 〉, (8)
with W ∈ {U, V } and a ∈ {u, v}; Bob uses the von Neu-
mann POVMs Ba := |a〉〈a|.
For optimal KGxy, the inner products 〈Uλu|Vλu〉 and
〈Uλv|Vλv〉 must be real and have the same sign 3 ε0λ ∈ ±1.
Checking optimality is essentially to check the following
parallelism:
|Uλu〉 ‖ |Vλu〉 and |Uλv〉 ‖ |Vλv〉.
The PIJSs |X〉, |Y 〉 are optimal for Eve with a POVM
{Eλ} iff the following conditions are satisfied:√
Duv |Uλu〉 = ελ
√
1−Duv |Vλu〉, (9.u)√
Duv |Vλv〉 = ελ
√
1−Duv |Uλv〉. (9.v)
Similarly, analogous conditions hold for the optimality of
the PIJSs in uv basis.
3 Henceforth, we use the notations λβ and εβλ to denote the eigen-
values and their signs [6] in a basis β.
B. A new necessary and sufficient condition towards
completely characterizing Eve’s optimal states
Now, we move from this NSC to derive a refined one.
In this pursuit, we move through a series of iff conditions
that eventually derives the optimal IVs in terms of the
optimal measurement basis.
The following observation is going to help finding a
refined certificate for optimality.
Lemma 1. The post-interaction states of Eve exhibit an
interrelation involving the overlap between the two undis-
turbed states and that between the two disturbed states.
(1−Dxy) 〈ξx|ξy〉+Dxy〈ζx|ζy〉 = 2DuvDuv.
The result follows by considering the inter-
relations (26) between the IVs across the bases,
while imposing the normalization constraint on |ξu〉.
Here we derive a series of iff conditions for an interac-
tion to be optimal. The following conditions are equiva-
lent.
Theorem 1. The set of interaction vectors IVxy is op-
timal along with the projectors Eλ := |Eλ〉〈Eλ| for mea-
surement iff any of the following conditions hold:
1. The overlap between the measurement direction
|Eλ〉 in xy basis and the IVs in uv basis are related
in the following way:
〈Eλ|ξu〉 = ε0λ 〈Eλ|ζv〉,
〈Eλ|ξv〉 = ε0λ 〈Eλ|ζu〉. (10)
Corollary 1: The overlap between the IVs in xy
basis satisfy the following condition:
〈ξx|ξy〉 = 〈ζx|ζy〉 = 1− 2Duv. (11)
2. The overlaps between the measurement direction
|Eλ〉 in xy basis and the IVs in the same basis must
maintain the following ratio:
〈Eλ|ξx〉
〈Eλ|ξy〉 =
〈Eλ|ζx〉
〈Eλ|ζy〉 =
D
(+,ε0λ)
uv
D
(−,ε0λ)
uv
=
(
D+uv
D−uv
)ε0λ
. (12)
Here, we improvise to the following notation
D
(σ,ε0λ)
uv =
1√
2
(√
1−Duv + σε0λ
√
Duv
)
, (13)
with the sign parameter σ = ±1. It becomes D+uv or
D−uv, depending on whether the product σε
0
λ becomes
plus or minus, respectively.
3. The interaction vectors in the xy basis
can be expressed in an orthonormal basis
6{|E+λξ〉, |E−λξ〉, |E+λζ〉, |E−λζ〉} as follows:
|ξx〉 = D+uv|E+λξ〉+D−uv|E−λξ〉,
|ξy〉 = D−uv|E+λξ〉+D+uv|E−λξ〉,
|ζx〉 = D+uv|E+λζ〉+D−uv|E−λζ〉,
|ζy〉 = D−uv|E+λζ〉+D+uv|E−λζ〉. (14)
The basis vectors |E±λξ〉, |E±λζ〉 correspond to some
unitary transform R± of those two measurement
directions |Eλ〉 that provide ±ve outcomes.
The above four iff conditions in Thm. 1 are equivalent,
in the sense that any of them can be derived [see Sec. V]
from the other one, directly, or via some of the remaining
conditions as sketched below.
NSC (9) of [2]
for Optimality Thm. 1.1
Optimal IVs
in [6, Eq.(38)]
New NSC [Cor. 1]
for Optimality Thm. 1.2
Optimal IVs
in Thm. 1.3
≡
It’s interesting to notice the change of basis while de-
scribing the overlap between Eve’s measurement direc-
tions and the IVs. While Eve’s measurements are con-
sidered in xy basis, the IVs are counted for uv basis and
for xy basis in Eq. (10) and Eq. (12), respectively.
C. Explaining the iff conditions
Let’s explain the essence of the four iff conditions de-
scribed in Thm. 1 involving the optimality of the four
interaction vectors in the xy basis.
The 1st iff condition says that the overlap between a
measurement direction |Eλ〉 and a fidelity state corre-
sponding to Alice’s signal u (or v) is same in magnitude
as the overlap between that measurement direction and
the disturbed state corresponding to Alice’s signal v (or
u), except that they differ in sign ε0λ.
The 2nd iff condition says that the ratio of the overlaps
between a measurement direction and the undisturbed
states are same as the ratio of the overlaps between the
measurement direction and the disturbed states. The ra-
tio becomes D
+
uv/D−uv or its inverse depending on whether
the measurement outcome is positive or negative in sign.
The 3rd iff condition provides the optimal interaction
vectors, and therefore are the only and all possible op-
timal IVs. They are unitarily equivalent to those in [6,
Eq.(38)] [see Sec. V C].
The iff condition in Corollary 1, which is a byproduct
of the 1st iff condition of Thm. 1, restricts Eve’s
optimal states to have a specific orientation in the
four-dimensional Hilbert space. To be more specific,
when Alice encodes is xy basis, the overlap between
the two fidelity states must be same as the overlap be-
tween the two disturbed states and is equal to (1−2Duv).
The new NSC and its significance: The neces-
sary and sufficient condition in Corollary 1 can be used
as a working formula to verify whether a given set of IVs
is optimal or not. It’s efficient due to easy verification,
it’s simple as it involves Eve’s states only than the joint
Hilbert space as in [2], it’s intuitive as it demands a spe-
cific configuration of the states in Eve’s Hilbert space.
An optimal attack is essentially characterized by the
optimal overlap, called here as optimal syndrome, that
amounts to 1 − 2D for a symmetric attack. It exhibits
interesting links between various other approaches for
eavesdropping. Although the connection between Bell
violation and optimal state discrimination is known [2],
we find the connection more explicit here with respect
to the optimal syndrome. For a specific error-rate D,
the fraction of reduction in the optimal CHSH-sum in an
eb scheme is precisely the optimal syndrome in the p&m
scheme. The Bloch vector at the receiving end shrinks
by the same factor.
IV. DERIVING OPTIMAL UNITARY
EVOLUTIONS
Given the optimal PIJSs |X?〉, |Y ?〉, we wish to find an
optimal unitary for a suitable initial state |ψ0〉 of Eve’s
ancilla. Mathematically speaking, the task is to solve the
following equations.
UAEψ0 |0〉A|ψ0〉E = |X?〉, UAEψ0 |1〉A|ψ0〉E = |Y ?〉. (15)
Although the same unitary serves the purpose in the
conjugate basis, the measurement setup generally differs.
Given a specific reconciled basis, Eve’s measurement ba-
sis is in one-to-one correspondence with the PIJSs: dif-
ferent measurement bases correspond to different PIJSs.
Thus, we parameterize the PIJSs as |X〉M, |Y 〉M on a
measurement setup that corresponds to an unitary trans-
form Mxy := [|E0〉, |E1〉, |E2〉, |E3〉] of the computational
basis.
A. Optimal PIJSs for different measurement bases
The PIJSs described in Eq. (2) live in eight dimensional
Hilbert space as the attacker uses a two-qubit probe. The
PIJSs are optimal whenever Eve’s IVs are optimal for
which we prefer Eq. (3) over Eq. (14) for simplicity.
For two-qubit probe of Eve, a PIJS live in eight dimen-
sional Hilbert space. Assume, Alice’s qubit is prepared
in xy basis. Let’s consider two different choices of Eve’s
Measurement basis {|Eλ〉}:
1. the computational basis = {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉},
2. the Fuchs basis = {|00〉, |11〉, |10〉, |01〉}.
7The optimal states are denoted by |X?〉C , |Y ?〉C in the
first case, and by |X?〉F , |Y ?〉F in the second case. Their
vector form are tabulated below. One may consider any
|X〉C |Y 〉C |X〉F |Y 〉F√
Fxy D
+
uv√
Fxy D
−
uv
0
0
0
0√
Dxy D
+
uv√
Dxy D
−
uv
0
0√
Dxy D
−
uv√
Dxy D
+
uv√
Fxy D
−
uv√
Fxy D
+
uv
0
0
√
Fxy D
+
uv
0
0√
Fxy D
−
uv
0√
Dxy D
−
uv√
Dxy D
+
uv
0
0√
Dxy D
+
uv√
Dxy D
−
uv
0√
Fxy D
−
uv
0
0√
Fxy D
+
uv
other measurement basis, where each measurement direc-
tion perhaps include all the computational basis states in
its superposition. In that case, the corresponding PIJS
may not have any zero entries in its co-ordinated form.
We’ll show how such ‘complicated’ measurements can eas-
ily be tackled by our approach surpassing the difficulty
of the rudimentary basis-completion method as discussed
below.
B. Basis completion method to get an optimal
unitary, and its shortcomings.
Following is the basic mathematical approach to solve
Eq. (15).
By introducing some auxiliary states, an uni-
tary evolution Uψ0 can be viewed as a linear
transformation that maps an orthonormal basis
{|0〉A|ψi〉E , |1〉A|ψi〉E}i∈{0,1,2,3} to the orthonormal ba-
sis {|Xi〉, |Yi〉}i∈{0,1,2,3}, where |X0〉 = |X?〉, |Y0〉 = |Y ?〉.
Uψ0 |0〉A|ψi〉E = |Xi〉, Uψ0 |1〉A|ψi〉E = |Yi〉,
∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Then a solution for the optimal unitary can be given by
Uψ0 =
3∑
i=0
(|Xi〉〈0A|+ |Yi〉〈1A|) 〈ψi|E . (16)
which can further be factored [see Sec. V E] in two uni-
taries as
Uψ0 = UAEX,Y (1A2 ⊗WE†ψ0 ). (17)
The first unitary UX,Y , that depends on the PIJSs
|X?〉, |Y ?〉, is defined as
UX,Y :=
3∑
i=0
|Xi〉〈0A|〈iE |+ |Yi〉〈1A|〈iE |, (18)
which has the following matrix representation
[ |X0〉, |X1〉, |X2〉, |X3〉, |Y0〉, |Y1〉, |Y2〉, |Y3〉 ] .
The local unitary W, that depends on the initial state
|ψ0〉, is defined as follows
WEψ0 =
3∑
i=0
|ψi〉〈iE | (19)
which has the following matrix representation
[ |ψ0〉 |ψ1〉 |ψ2〉 |ψ3〉 ] .
How does an optimal unitary works: We observe from
Eq. (17) that an optimal unitary is a product of two
unitaries. In order to evolve the joint system from the
initial state |a〉|e〉, the part of it first transforms Eve’s
initial state to |00〉 leaving Alice’s part invariant, and
then the second part creates the required entanglement
between Alice and Eve’s states.
Infinitely many solutions: Note that, given the opti-
mal PIJSs |X?〉, |Y ?〉 and an initial state |ψ0〉, a solution
of Eq. (15) for the unitary Uψ0 is not unique. There are
infinitely many solutions: each of UX,Y and Wψ0 repre-
sent an infinite family of unitaries. Thus, the arbitration
of an optimal unitary U is two-fold:
1. arbitration of UX,Y , which depends on the various
choices of the auxiliary states {|Xi〉, |Yi〉}i=1,2,3.
2. arbitration of Wψ0 due to various choices of the
free variables |ψi〉i=1,2,3 required to complete the
orthonormalization.
Shortcoming with that approach: Getting a specific
optimal unitary Uψ0 corresponds to the problem of basis
completion: once in the eight dimensional space of op-
timal PIJSs, and once in the four dimensional space of
the initial state. To complete an orthonormal basis is not
always straightforward, a trial and error approach may
work following some calculation-intensive efforts. For in-
stance, one may try it for the two measurement bases
stated in Sec. IV A. But, for ‘complicated’ measurements,
basis completion is really a challenging task. On the
other hand, different ordering of the auxiliary states lead
to different optimal unitaries following a fresh compu-
tation. To pinpoint the simplest one (canonical form)
among the infinite zoo of optimal unitaries is not imme-
diate, which otherwise may be important from practical
designing perspective.
How do we overcome: To overcome all these practical
shortcomings with the approach of basis completion, we
suggest henceforth a series of methodologies to obtain all
possible optimal unitaries more easily. As a first step,
we propose the following hack to adopt a completely
new approach which is surprisingly easy and natural that
provides an optimal unitary along with a specific initial
state. The resulted optimal unitary is the simplest one
(as we’ll see shortly) among its all other alternative sib-
lings, possibly helpful in designing an unitary operator
8for real implementations. Once we get an optimal uni-
tary, it’s easier to find its siblings by exploiting the fac-
torization property explained in the earlier subsection.
C. A divide and conquer hack to get an optimal
unitary
We can think of the optimal unitary as the following
partitioned matrix U = [Ux Uy]. Then, the optimal
PIJSs can be written in the following way
|X?〉 = Ux|e〉, |Y ?〉 = Uy|e〉.
Therefore, for some initial state |e〉, if we can find two
such submatrices Ux and Uy, we can construct the opti-
mal unitary from them.
For example, consider that Eve measures in computa-
tional basis. Then, one can write the optimal PIJSs in
such an way that (see Sec. V)
Ux = (|00〉 |11〉)⊗ 12, and Uy = (|10〉 |01〉)⊗ σx,
for the initial state |e〉 = |∆H〉E := |∆xy〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 ,
which consists of the following factored states
|∆β〉 :=
√
Fβ |0〉+
√
Dβ |1〉,
|∆Hβ 〉 := H|∆β〉 = D+β |0〉+D−β |1〉. (20)
An optimal unitary can be read from this as below.
Uc∆H =

1
E2
2 · · ·
· · · σE2x
· · σE2x ·
· 1E22 · ·
 . (21)
The superscript E2 denotes which subsystem of Eve will
it work on.
D. Alternate solutions for optimal unitaries
Here we explain how to find alternate optimal unitaries
for an IS by already knowing an optimal unitary for that
IS. We completely characterize the two-level arbitration.
Theorem 2. For a given initial state |ψ0〉, let an optimal
unitary is known as Uψ0 . For the same initial state, a new
optimal unitary U ′ψ0 can be found in one of the following
ways.
1. A change in the basis spanning the orthogonal sub-
space of the IS |ψ0〉 leads to an alternate optimal
unitary
U ′ψ0 = Uψ0(12 ⊗ Γψ⊥0 ).
The local unitary Γψ⊥0 =
[
1 ·
· T †
ψ⊥0
]
makes an alter-
nate choice W ′ψ0 for Wψ0 :
W ′ψ0 =Wψ0Γψ⊥0 = [ |ψ0〉 |ψ1〉
′ |ψ2〉′ |ψ3〉′ ] .
The 3 dimensional unitary Tψ⊥0 transforms the or-
thonormal basis |ψi〉i=1,2,3 to a newer one, while
Γψ⊥0 leaves |ψ0〉 intact.
2. A change in the basis spanning the orthogonal sub-
space of the PIJSs |X?〉, |Y ?〉 leads to an alternate
optimal unitary
U ′ψ0 = U ′XY Wψ0 = UXY ΓX⊥Y ⊥ Wψ0 .
The global unitary
ΓX⊥Y ⊥ = diag (ΓX⊥ ,ΓY ⊥)
transforms UXY to a new one U ′XY = UXY ΓX⊥Y ⊥
having the following matrix representation:[ |X?〉 |X ′1〉 |X ′2〉 |X ′3〉 |Y?〉 |Y ′1〉 |Y ′2〉 |Y ′3〉 ]
by changing the basis-states {|Xi〉, |Yi〉} 7→
{|X ′i〉, |Y ′i 〉} for i = 1, 2, 3 while leaving the optimal
PIJSs |X?〉, |Y ?〉 intact.
3. due to a change in both of the above bases.
Note that, the first rule doesn’t require the factoriza-
tion. Given an optimal unitary, an alternate solution can
be found by post-multiplying the former by 12⊗Γψ⊥0 . For
instance, let’s find an alternate optimal unitary for the
initial state |ψ0〉 = |∆H〉E := |∆xy〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 . A solu-
tion U∆H is already found in Eq. (21). We can simply
post-multiply it by some 12 ⊗ Γψ⊥0 , where the local uni-
tary is chosen as, say,
Γψ⊥0 =

1 · · ·
· 1√
2
· 1√
2
· · 1 ·
· 1√
2
· − 1√
2
 .
The post-multiplication will affect the (2nd, 4th) and
(6th, 8th) columns of the unitary U∆H as follows
C2 7→ C2+C4√2 , C4 7→
C2−C4√
2
;
C6 7→ C6+C8√2 , C8 7→
C6−C8√
2
.
Any such alternate solution for the optimal unitary U∆H
introduces more non-NULL entries than that in Eq. (21).
Thereby, the one in Eq. (21) is the simplest among all
other alternatives.
Although nothing can stop one to apply an arbitration
on UXY at that stage by getting the factors of U∆H guided
by Eq. (17) following painstaking calculations while com-
pleting a basis for the initial state |∆H〉E , we find it easier
when we get an optimal unitary for the initial state |00〉.
Because, for the later case, one can choose a basis for the
orthogonal subspace to enforce W∆H to be the identity
matrix, and UXY becomes same as U∆H . But to do so,
we have to devise the methods to get an optimal unitary
for a different IS using the knowledge of a given optimal
unitary for some other IS.
9TABLE I: An optimal unitary for each of the initial states |00〉, and |φ+xy〉 = |00〉+|11〉√2 when Eve measures in four
dimensional computational basis and Fuchs basis, respectively. Here O2 and ~02 are the two dimensional NULL
matrix and NULL row-vector, respectively.
UC00 =

√
Fxy
[
D+uv −D−uv
D−uv D
+
uv
] √
Dxy
[
D+uv −D−uv
D−uv D
+
uv
]
O2 O2
O2 O2
√
Dxy
[
D−uv D
+
uv
D+uv −D−uv
]
−√Fxy [D−uv D+uv
D+uv −D−uv
]
O2 O2
√
Fxy
[
D−uv D
+
uv
D+uv −D−uv
] √
Dxy
[
D−uv D
+
uv
D+uv −D−uv
]
√
Dxy
[
D+uv −D−uv
D−uv D
+
uv
]
−√Fxy [D+uv −D−uv
D−uv D
+
uv
]
O2 O2

UFφ+ =

D+xy(D
+
uv −D−uv) D−xy(−D−uv D+uv) #»0 2 #»0 2
#»
0 2
#»
0 2 −D−xy(D+uv −D−uv) D+xy(−D−uv D+uv)
#»
0 2
#»
0 2 −D−xy(D−uv D+uv) D+xy(D+uv D−uv)
D+xy(D
−
uv D
+
uv) D
−
xy(D
+
uv D
−
uv)
#»
0 2
#»
0 2
#»
0 2
#»
0 2 D
+
xy(D
−
uv D
+
uv) D
−
xy(D
+
uv D
−
uv)
−D−xy(D−uv D+uv) D+xy(D+uv D−uv) #»0 2 #»0 2
−D−xy(D+uv −D−uv) D+xy(−D−uv D+uv) #»0 2 #»0 2
#»
0 2
#»
0 2 D
+
xy(D
+
uv −D−uv) D−xy(−D−uv D+uv)

E. Finding an optimal unitary when Eve’s initial
state changes
If an unitary Ue is known for some initial state |e〉,
one can find an unitary Uf for some other IS |f〉, just by
knowing the local unitary Tef that transforms |e〉 7→ |f〉
[see Sec. V F for details]. Then, the change in the global
unitary is reflected as
Uf = Ue
(
1
A
2 ⊗ TE†ef
)
. (22)
For instance, consider the task to find an optimal uni-
tary for the initial state |∆〉E := |∆xy〉E1 |∆uv〉E2 , which
is a small tweak Tef = 12 ⊗ H : |∆H〉E 7→ |∆〉E of the
earlier initial state |∆H〉E . Then, the global unitary is
transformed as follows
UC∆ = UC∆H(1A2 ⊗ 1E12 ⊗ HE2).
The corresponding matrix is a tweak of the one in
Eq. (21) while each inner sub-matrix 12, σx gets post-
multiplied by the Hadamard transformation H.
It’s now easy to get an optimal unitary for the IS
= |00〉E . A local unitary Tef = AE1xy ⊗AE2uv maps |∆〉E :=
|∆xy〉E1 |∆uv〉E2 7→ |00〉 for the two-dimensional unitary
Auv =
√
1−Duvσz +
√
Duvσx. The desired optimal uni-
tary UC00 is given in Table I.
Now we can read the auxiliary basis states from the
optimal unitary U00. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th columns
stand for the basis states |X1〉, |X2〉, |X3〉 respectively,
while the 6th, 7th and 8th columns stand for the basis
states |Y1〉, |Y2〉, |Y3〉 respectively. Now, the basis com-
pletion method works well without much trial and error
calculations. At that stage, one may try getting alternate
solutions by applying arbitration on UXY .
Can these complete information of the basis states pro-
vide any advantage to find an optimal unitary for any
other initial state? One can certainly come up with a
solution, but a simpler form is again a far cry without
a trial and error in choosing a proper position for the
basis states in UXY and Wψ0 . For instance, one can
try it for the IS |φ+xy〉 := |00〉+|11〉√2 to realize the diffi-
culty. We avoid it by following the indirect approach:
knowing an optimal unitary for the IS |00〉, find an opti-
mal unitary for the IS |φ+xy〉. Note that, a local unitary
Tef = c-σx ·(H⊗12) : |00〉 7→ |φ+xy〉, which has the matrix
form 1√
2
[
12 ·
· σx
] [
12 12
12 −12
]
= 1√
2
[
12 12
σx −σx
]
, can lead
to an optimal global unitary UCφ+ = UC00
(
1A2 ⊗ (TEef )†
)
.
One can now extend the methods employed here to get
an optimal unitary for an arbitrarily chosen initial state.
Further, one can use the directives in Subsec. IV D to
obtain as many optimal unitary as one may wish for a
chosen initial state.
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F. Finding an optimal unitary when Eve’s
measurement setup changes.
Note, from the factorization in Eq. (17), that the joint
unitary U depends on two parameters: the initial state IS
of Eve’s ancilla, and Eve’s measurement setup M ≡Mxy.
It is so because, the factors of the unitary Wψ0 and UXY
depends on IS and M, respectively. However, U = UMIS
represent an infinite collection of unitaries.
So far we have explored the zoo of optimal unitaries
when Eve measures in the computational basis. Now,
we augment the hunting when a different measurement
basis is used by Eve. Let’s consider a different mea-
surement basis {|Eλ〉} which is a unitary transformation
|Eλ〉 = Mxy|λ〉 of the computational basis chosen ear-
lier. Then, the following retrospective effects could be
observed on the optimal IVs, the optimal PIJSs, and the
optimal global unitary.
1. The optimal IVs of Eve are changed as follows:
|IV?xy〉M = Mxy|IV?xy〉C . (23)
2. The optimal PIJSs are transformed as follows:
|Sa〉M = (12 ⊗Mxy)|Sa〉C , a = x, y. (24)
3. The global unitary gets tweaked as follows:
UM = (12 ⊗Mxy) UC . (25)
The first two claims are straight-forward, while the last
claim is proved in Sec. V.
To illustrate, consider the problem of finding an op-
timal unitary when Eve measures in Fuchs basis and
chooses the IS as |φ+xy〉. The optimal PIJSs, which
are already enlisted in Sec. IV A, can also be found
by the rule |X〉F = (12 ⊗ Mxy)|X〉C , where Mxy =
[|00〉, |11〉, |10〉, |01〉]. To get an optimal unitary in the
Fuchs basis, we exploit the already known structure of
an optimal unitary UCφ+ which works on the same IS,
but measures in computational basis. The transforma-
tion rule 25 leads to the optimal unitary UFφ+ as given in
Table I.
V. PROOFS AND CALCULATIONS
A. Interrelation between optimal POVMs
Since the conjugate relation for the encoding bases in-
herits to the PIJSs, the IVs in each of the encoding bases
gets interrelated as follows.
2
√
Fuv|ξu〉=
√
Fxy(|ξx〉+|ξy〉)+
√
Dxy(|ζx〉+|ζy〉),
2
√
Fuv|ξv〉=
√
Fxy(|ξx〉+|ξy〉)−
√
Dxy(|ζx〉+|ζy〉),
2
√
Duv|ζu〉=
√
Fxy(|ξx〉−|ξy〉)+
√
Dxy(|ζy〉−|ζx〉),
2
√
Duv|ζv〉=
√
Fxy(|ξx〉−|ξy〉)−
√
Dxy(|ζy〉−|ζx〉).
(26)
The sum and difference between the fidelity states (and
similarly for the disturbed states) in uv basis are written
in terms of the Eve’s states in xy basis.√
Fuv (|ξu〉+ |ξv〉) =
√
Fxy (|ξx〉+|ξy〉) , (27.F+)√
Fuv (|ξu〉 − |ξv〉) =
√
Dxy (|ζx〉+|ζy〉) , (27.F–)√
Duv (|ζu〉+ |ζv〉) =
√
Fxy (|ξx〉−|ξy〉) , (27.D+)√
Duv (|ζu〉 − |ζv〉) =
√
Dxy (|ζy〉−|ζx〉) . (27.D–)
Now, we use the optimal IVs for xy and uv basis as in
Eqs. (3, 5) to find the sum and difference of the parity
IVs (disturbed or undisturbed) and feed them back into
Eq. (27) to get the following relations:
|F0〉+|F1〉 = |E0〉+|E1〉, |F2〉+|F3〉 = |E0〉−|E1〉,
|F0〉−|F1〉 = |E2〉+|E3〉, |F2〉+|F3〉 = |E3〉−|E2〉.
Getting the relation between the optimal measurement
directions in Eq. (6) is now obvious.
B. Proving the necessary and sufficient conditions
Here we prove Thm. 1. The following relations involv-
ing the amplitudes D+uv and D
−
uv defined in Eq. (4) are
heavily used in the derivations here.
(D+uv)
2−(D−uv)2 = 2
√
Duv(1−Duv), (D+uv)2 + (D−uv)2 = 1,
2D+uvD
−
uv = 1− 2Duv.
Proof of the iff condition 1 of Thm. 1. The catch
here is to unfold the states in Eq. (8) for the projec-
tors Eλ while using the Schmidt form of the PIJSs, and
use them in Eq. (9). In Eq. (8), for a = u,
|Uλ0u〉 = Bu ⊗ Eλ |U〉
=
√
1−Duv 〈Eλ|ξu〉 (|u〉|Eλ〉) .
|Vλ0u〉 = Bu ⊗ Eλ |V 〉
=
√
Duv 〈Eλ|ζv〉 (|u〉|Eλ〉) .
Feeding them back into Eq. (9.u) leads to the first of the
equations (10). The other relation can similarly be de-
rived from the iff condition (9.v) while using the Schmidt
form of the PIJSs and unfolding the states in Eq. (8) for
a = v.
Proof of the iff condition 2 of Thm. 1. The
iff conditions in Eq. (10) can be grouped as follows:
〈Eλ|(|ξu〉 ± |ξv〉) = ε0λ 〈Eλ|(|ζv〉 ± |ζu〉).
Now, we look back to the interrelations between the IVs
in xy and uv basis, viz., use Eqs. (27.F+, 27.D+). Taking
the inner product of the IVs in each of these equations
with the measurement direction |Eλ〉, and then taking
the ratio of the like sides, we get,
〈Eλ|ξx〉+〈Eλ|ξy〉
〈Eλ|ξx〉−〈Eλ|ξy〉 =
√
Fuv√
Duv
〈Eλ|ξu〉+〈Eλ|ξv〉
〈Eλ|ζu〉+〈Eλ|ζv〉 =
√
Fuv√
Duv
ε0λ.
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By componendo and dividendo, we get,
〈Eλ|ξx〉
〈Eλ|ξy〉 =
D
(+ε0λ)
uv
D
(−ε0λ)
uv
=
(
Duv
Duv
)ε0λ
.
We used here the improvised notation of Eq. (13). The
ratio D
(+ε0λ)
uv /D(−ε
0
λ)
uv becomes Duv/Duv or its inverse depend-
ing on whether the sign ε0λ of the eigenvalue assumes +1
or −1, respectively.
Similarly, to establish the other ratio 〈Eλ|ζx〉/〈Eλ|ζy〉 of
Eq. (12), we consider Eqs. (27.F–, 27.D–) and follow the
same procedure as above.
Proof of the iff condition 3 of Thm. 1. The proof
follows from the iff condition 2, viz., Eq. (12). The over-
laps in the ratio 〈Eλ|ξx〉/〈Eλ|ξy〉 can be unfolded using some
(complex) constant of proportion rλ,ξ as follows.
〈Eλ|ξx〉 = rλ,ξ D (+ε
0
λ)
uv , 〈Eλ|ξy〉 = rλ,ξ D (−ε
0
λ)
uv .
Note that, these overlaps constitute the components
of the fidelity states when expressed in the eigenbasis
{|Eλ〉}.
Similarly, in the ratio 〈Eλ|ζx〉/〈Eλ|ζy〉, the overlaps can
be written, for some complex number rλ,ζ , in the follow-
ing way.
〈Eλ|ζx〉 = rλ,ζ D (+ε
0
λ)
uv , 〈Eλ|ζy〉 = rλ,ζ D (−ε
0
λ)
uv .
These are the components of the disturbed states when
expressed in the eigenbasis {|Eλ〉}.
Then we can write down the IVs with respect to the
eigenbasis {|Eλ〉} as follows.
|ξx〉 =
∑
λ
rλ,ξ D
(+ε0λ)
uv |Eλ〉,
|ξy〉 =
∑
λ
rλ,ξ D
(−ε0λ)
uv |Eλ〉,
|ζx〉 =
∑
λ
rλ,ζ D
(+ε0λ)
uv |Eλ〉,
|ζy〉 =
∑
λ
rλ,ζ D
(−ε0λ)
uv |Eλ〉.
But, we observe that, D
(+ε0λ)
uv = D+uv,D
−
uv for ε
0
λ =
+1,−1 respectively. Similarly, D (−ε0λ)uv = D−uv,D+uv for
ε0λ = +1,−1 respectively. Thereby, in the expression of
the IVs, we can group the basis vectors |Eλ〉 according
to the sign of the measurement outcome. For instance,
each of the fidelity states get two groups: |E±λξ〉 groups
the measurement directions for ±ve outcomes. Similarly,
the two groups for the disturbed states correspond to
|E±λζ〉. The following equation captures the grouping:
|E±λξ〉 :=
∑
λ: ±ve outcomes
rλ,ξ|Eλ〉,
|E±λζ〉 :=
∑
λ: ±ve outcomes
rλ,ζ |Eλ〉.
With these grouping, the IVs can be described as in
Eq. (14). That the vectors {|E+λξ〉, |E−λξ〉, |E+λζ〉, |E−λζ〉}
form an orthonormal basis, can be argued as follows. As
defined, the states in E+λ := {|E+λξ〉, |E+λζ〉} are mutually
orthogonal to the states in E−λ := {|E−λξ〉, |E−λζ〉}. Then,
the normalization constraint on the fidelity (or disturbed)
states together induces the normalization constraint on
the states in E+λ (or E
−
λ ). Moreover, the orthogonality
between the fidelity states and the disturbed states in-
herits the orthogonality within the states in E+λ as well
the orthogonality within the states in E−λ .
The last but not the least is the fact that each of
the states {|E+λξ〉, |E−λξ〉, |E+λζ〉, |E−λζ〉} can be expressed
in terms of exactly two of the measurement directions
{|Eλ〉}. It is so because, the sign of the measurement
outcomes are evenly distributed for an optimal interac-
tion: two +ve outcomes, and two -ve outcomes. Had it
not been this way, then, w.l.o.g, let’s assume the possi-
bility for only one +ve outcome. Then, each of the states
|E+λξ〉, |E+λζ〉 should have only one of the measurement di-
rections |Eλ〉 in their description. While the normaliza-
tion constraint on these states indicate the coefficients
rλ,ξ, rλ,ζ to be unimodular, their mutual orthogonality
enforces one of these coefficients to be zero, leading to a
contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1 of Thm. 1. The proof follows
from condition 1 of the same theorem and Lem. 1.
Clearly, an equality of the overlaps in Lem. 1 lead to
the desired result (11). To establish this equality, we
consider the iff conditions (10), but for optimality in uv
basis, viz.
〈Fλ|ξx〉 = ε1λ 〈Fλ|ζy〉,
〈Fλ|ξy〉 = ε1λ 〈Fλ|ζx〉.
Multiplying the like sides of these two equations and
adding over the measurement outcomes λ in uv basis,
we get, ∑
λ〈ξx|Fλ〉〈Fλ|ξy〉 =
∑
λ〈ζx|Fλ〉〈Fλ|ζy〉.
Since the projectors Fλ consist a POVM, their complete-
ness relation leads to the equality between the two over-
laps 〈ξx|ξy〉 and 〈ζx|ζy〉, and consequently the desired
result follows from Lem. 1.
C. The two representations of the optimal IVs are
unitarily equivalent
To establish the equivalence of the optimal IVxy in
Eq. (3) and those in Eq. (14) we make a matrix-vector
representation of the IVs. We introduce a few notations
for that in Table II. Here, OLD denotes IVs in Eq. (3)
and NEW denotes IVs in Eq. (14). Those optimal IVs
can be expressed in matrix-vector form as follows:
(a?xy)
OLD = MOLDxy Duv,
(a?xy)
NEW = MNEWxy Duv.
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TABLE II: Notations: matrix-vector form of optimal IV
axy := (|ξx〉, |ξy〉, |ζx〉, |ζy〉),
MNEWxy ≡ M+−+−ξ,ξ,ζ,ζ := (|E+λξ〉, |E−λξ〉, |E+λζ〉, |E−λζ〉),
M++−−ξ,ζ,ξ,ζ := (|E+λξ〉, |E+λζ〉, |E−λξ〉, |E−λζ〉),
M++−−0,2,1,3 := (|E+0 〉, |E+2 〉, |E−1 〉, |E−3 〉),
MOLDxy ≡ M+−+−0,1,2,3 := (|E+0 〉, |E−1 〉, |E+2 〉, |E−3 〉),
Duv := 12 ⊗
(
D+uv12 +D
−
uvσx
)
.
To establish the equivalence, it’s enough to show that
MNEWxy is unitarily equivalent to M
OLD
xy . The intermedi-
ate transformations are as follows:
MOLDxy
≡
M+−+−0,1,2,3
Sw−→ M++−−0,2,1,3 R−→ M++−−ξ,ζ,ξ,ζ
Sw−→
MNEWxy
≡
M+−+−ξ,ξ,ζ,ζ
All the three maps are post-multiplication to transform
the column-space, e.g., M++−−0,2,1,3 = M
+−+−
0,1,2,3 Sw etc. The
swap operation
Sw :=
1 0 0 00 0 1 00 1 0 0
0 0 0 1

corresponds to the permutation Π1324.
The unitary R := diag(R+,R−) works on the mea-
surement directions in order to affect unitarily the two
subspaces, one for positive outcomes and the other for
negative outcomes. To be specific, the measurement di-
rections {|E±0 〉, |E±2 〉} go through an unitary transforma-
tion R± in that subspace.
Therefore, we get the following interrelation between
the POVMs associated with the NEW and OLD optimal
IVs.
MNEWxy = M
OLD
xy Sw R Sw.
Hence the equivalence follows.
D. Getting an optimal unitary for some initial state
when Eve measures in the computational basis
First, we find the optimal IVs and the optimal PIJSs
as Eve measures in computational basis.
Her optimal IVs can be expressed as follows:
|ξ?x〉C= |0〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 , |ξ?y〉C=(1E12 ⊗ σE2x )|ξ?x〉C ,
|ζ?x〉C= |1〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 , |ζ?y 〉C=(1E12 ⊗ σE2x )|ζ?x〉C .
Here the state |∆Huv〉 is as defined in Eq. (20).
Therefore, the optimal PIJSAExy can be expressed as
follows
|X?〉C = |Φ+Dxy 〉AE1 |∆Huv〉E2 ,
|Y ?〉C = |Ψ+Dxy 〉AE1 ⊗ σE2x |∆Huv〉E2 .
where
|Φ+Dxy 〉AE1 =
√
1−Dxy|00〉AE1+
√
Dxy|11〉AE1 ,
|Ψ+Dxy 〉AE1 =
√
1−Dxy|10〉AE1+
√
Dxy|01〉AE1 .
To get an optimal unitary, we need to rewrite the PI-
JSs in matrix-vector form. First, note that the entan-
gled states from the subsystem AE1 can be expressed in
matrix-vector form as follows
|Φ+Dxy 〉AE1 = WAE1x |∆xy〉E1 ,
|Ψ+Dxy 〉AE1 = WAE1y |∆xy〉E1 ,
with the 4× 2 matrices
WAE1x = |00〉AE1〈0E1 |+ |11〉AE1〈1E1 |,
WAE1y = |10〉AE1〈0E1 |+ |01〉AE1〈1E1 |.
Thereby, the optimal PIJSAExy can be expressed in matrix-
vector form as follows:
|X?〉C = UAEx |∆xy〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 ,
|Y ?〉C = UAEy |∆xy〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 ,
with the 8× 4 matrices
UAEx = WAE1x ⊗ 1E22 , UAEy = WAE1y ⊗ σE2x .
Then, for an initial state
|∆H〉E := |∆xy〉E1 |∆Huv〉E2 ,
an optimal unitary can be given as
UAE∆H = UAEx 〈0|A + UAEy 〈1|A
= WAE1x 〈0|A ⊗ 1E22 +WAE1y 〈1|A ⊗ σE2x
= (|00〉AE1〈00|+ |11〉AE1〈01|)⊗ 1E22
+(|10〉AE1〈10|+ |01〉AE1〈11|)⊗ σE2x .
E. Factorization of an optimal unitary
The optimal unitary in Eq. (16) can be factored in the
following way
Uψ0 =
1∑
a=0
3∑
i=0
|Sa〉〈aA|〈ψi|E
=
1∑
a=0
3∑
i=0
|Sa〉〈aA|〈i|E |i〉〈ψi|E
=
1∑
a=0
3∑
i=0
|Sa〉〈aA|〈iE | ×
3∑
i=0
12 ⊗ |i〉E〈ψi|.
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F. Change in initial state and measurement
direction of Eve
The global unitary evolves the joint system as follows:
UMIS=e |a〉A|e〉E = |Sa〉MAE .
For a ∈ {x, y}, the PIJSs Sa ∈ {X,Y } gets fixed by fixing
the measurement directions M. However, the same PIJS
|S〉MAE can be produced for a different IS and a different
unitary:
UMIS=f |a〉A|f〉E = |Sa〉MAE .
Given an unitary UMIS=e, one can find an unitary UMIS=f
by knowing the local unitary that transforms |e〉 → |f〉.
Deriving Eq. (22): Since |f〉 = Tef |e〉, we get
Uf |a〉A|f〉E = |Sa〉AE = Ue |a〉A|e〉E
= Ue |a〉A ⊗ T †ef |f〉E
= Ue
(
1
A
2 ⊗ TE†ef
)
|a〉A|f〉E .
Deriving Eq. (25):
UM |0〉A|ψ0〉E = |X〉M = (12 ⊗Mxy) |X〉C
= (12 ⊗Mxy) UC |0〉A|ψ0〉E .
G. Optimal eavesdropping and some connections
1. Fidelity of Eve’s state discrimination
An optimal attack on the p&m scheme leaves Eve with
an optimal state-discriminate problem. For a specific en-
coding basis, the four different post-interaction states of
Eve’s ancilla can be grouped into two mutually orthogo-
nal sets: one with the two fidelity states, and the other
with the two disturbed states. Since Eve can discrimi-
nate these orthogonal sets (whether disturbed or not), all
she is left with is to distinguish the two states in a set,
e.g., distinguishing |ξa〉 from |ξa¯〉, or, distinguishing |ζa〉
from |ζa¯〉. Following the optimal strategy, Eve can dis-
tinguish the two such parity states (fidelity or disturbed)
with probability [12]
F βE =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− |〈ξβa |ξβa¯ 〉|2
=
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− (1− 2Dβ¯)2
=
1
2
+
√
Dβ¯(1−Dβ¯).
2. Secret-key rate
The secrecy capacity Cs of the quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob is defined [7] as the maximum rate
at which Alice can reliably send information to Bob leav-
ing Eve’s information on that data arbitrarily small. A
necessary and sufficient condition for a positive secret-key
rate is not known, but a lower bound is known [7]. For
a more general scenario, considering the knowledge gain
of Eve over Bob’s data (IBE) due to public discussion
over the supplementary classical channel, one can lower
bound the secrecy capacity [8] by the following formula
Cs ≥ max{IAB − IAE , IAB − IEB}.
Thus the legitimate parties should consider the channel
unsafe and abort the transmission whenever
IAB ≤ min{IAE , IEB}.
On the other hand, the legitimate parties can establish a
secret key following some one-way CPP, iff IAB > IAE
or IAB > IEB . For an optimal symmetric attack,
IAE = IEB . Therefore, Alice and Bob lives in the secure
zone whenever IAB > IAE . The difference IAB − IAE ,
that captures the secret-key rate, remains same during
the error correction and privacy amplification. Thus, the
condition transcends in order to establish a shared secret
between the two legitimate parties.
3. Optimal state-discrimination vs Bell-violation
The p&m scheme has its equivalent eb counter-
part where Alice prepares a maximally entangled state
|aa〉+|a¯a¯〉√
2
and send one of the particles to Bob. Both the
parties measure the observables σz, σx, chosen randomly.
The security of the eb scheme is linked to the tests
of quantum nonlocality [2]. Presence of non-locality is a
certificate for OW-CPP. The degree of non-locality de-
pends on the estimated value of the CHSH polynomial
for which the legitimate parties sacrifice a subset of their
particles. Alice measures one of the observables σz, σx
chosen randomly, while Bob measures one of the observ-
ables σz+σx√
2
, σz−σx√
2
chosen randomly. The binary mea-
surement outcomes ai, bj ∈ {−1,+1} are used to esti-
mate the CHSH correlation-coefficient which in turn is
the expected value of the product of the outcomes.
S := E(a1, b1) + E(a1, b2) + E(a2, b1)− E(a2, b2).
Due to some channel error D, each of the correlations
E(ai, bj |D) get reduced from its error-free counterpart
E(ai, bj) by a factor of 1− 2D:
E(ai, bj |D) = F · E(ai, bj)−D · E(ai, bj)
= (1− 2D) · E(ai, bj).
Consequently, SD = (1− 2D)S0.
The CHSH inequality forbids the correlation coefficient
S to exceed 2 for local operations and classical commu-
nication (LOCC). However, for an error-free quantum
channel, this inequality is violated and the correlation
amount reaches the maximum of 2
√
2. Then, in a quan-
tum channel with error D, the maximum amount of vio-
lation becomes S?D = (1− 2D)2
√
2. In order to maintain
quantum non-locality, this reduced sum must exceed 2,
which happens precisely for D < D? as in Eq. (7).
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4. Optimal attack contracts the Bloch vectors
The state |a〉β of a two-level quantum system (qubit)
corresponds to a Bloch vector ~aβ on the surface of the
Poincare´ sphere. Alices’ density operator ρA = |a〉β〈a| is
a convex combination 12 (1+ ~aβ · ~σ) of the Pauli opera-
tors. For the BB84 protocol, the states in the Z and the
X bases correspond to the Bloch vectors (0, 0,±1) and
(±1, 0, 0), respectively. Therefore, Alice sends the den-
sity operators 12 (1± σs) (for, s ∈ {z, x}) to Bob. But,
due to eavesdropping, Bob receives the density
ρB = F |a〉β〈a|+D|a¯〉β〈a¯|
= F · 1
2
(12 + ~aβ · ~σ) +D · 1
2
(12 − ~aβ · ~σ)
=
1
2
(12 + (F −D)~aβ · ~σ)
While Alice sends the density 12 (1+ ~a · ~σ), Bob receives
1
2 (1+ ηD~a · ~σ) with ηD = 1−2D. To be specific, the den-
sity operators 12 (1± σs) (for, s ∈ {z, x}) from Alice get
perturbed to 12 (1± ηDσs) when it reaches Bob. Thus,
eavesdropping shrinks the Bloch vectors by a factor of
ηD = 1− 2D.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have characterized the optimal attacks on BB84
protocol exhaustively, where an attacker entangles a four
dimensional probe per transmitted qubit. We have con-
sidered the generalized asymmetric error rates across the
two MUBs in order to uncover all possible choices for
an attacker, while a symmetric attack automatically be-
comes a special case. A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion is derived here to testify the optimality of an inter-
action performed by an eavesdropper. As it unveils, an
optimal attack corresponds to a specific configuration of
the attacker’s post-interaction states: that the overlap
between the two disturbed states are same as the over-
lap between the two undisturbed states and is equal to
the difference between the fidelity and the disturbance
at the receiving end. Interestingly enough, the optimal
overlap is same as the reduction in Bell violation in the
equivalent entanglement-based scheme. We have shown
explicitly that the optimal states of the joint system can
also be obtained by an optimal phase-covariant cloning
mechanism, and vice versa.
For practical purposes, all an eavesdropper requires
is the optimal unitary to evolve the joint system and
the corresponding measurement that she must perform
to glean the optimal information. We have developed
the methods to characterize the optimal unitaries and
demonstrated via examples. Our method could figure
out the simplest one out of the infinite family of optimal
unitaries in a most natural fashion. A salient feature of
an optimal unitary, as we have noticed here is that, it
first transforms Eve’s initial state to |00〉, and then cre-
ates the required entanglement between this transformed
state with Alice’s qubit. For that particular IS (|00〉), one
can read off the auxiliary basis states spanning the eight
dimensional subspace orthonormal to the optimal PIJSs,
directly from an optimal unitary, and vice versa. As an
optimal unitary is parameterized by the error-rate, an
attacker may first fix the QBER she wishes to introduce
and choose an optimal unitary (not unique) for a specific
choice of her measurement and the IS. An attacker would
like to choose such unitaries which, if feasible, is easier to
design than its siblings. As a further work, an interested
reader may explore the design of the optimal unitaries in
terms of universal quantum gates.
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